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Introduction1 
 
In recent years, the world has been shocked time and again by gruesome images and actions of 
the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (IS), but the footage and stories of children as young as 
eight executing people caused international outrage (Winter 2016). Children play an 
important role in the organisation: the children of the caliphate are seen as ‘the future of IS’, 
and education and propaganda are an important way of indoctrination (Engel 2016). IS has 
used children, from toddlers to teenagers, for suicide attacks, executions and fighting. 
Research has shown that IS propaganda between 2015-2016 included 89 eulogies of children 
and youths – a number that steadily increased on a monthly basis, showing that IS opts for 
this gruesome tactic gradually (Bloom et. al 2015-2016, 2). The role of minors and their future 
causes international concern for a broad range of reasons: growing up and potentially fighting 
in armed conflict will cause trauma for a number of these children (RAN 2016). Also, what 
will happen with these children if the Caliphate collapses? Human Rights Watch expressed 
concerns about the birth registrations that will most likely not be recognised by the 
international community – potentially leaving children stateless (Houry 2016).  
 
This article focuses on minors returning from IS-territory.2 When the Caliphate was declared, 
IS called on individuals to travel to the territory and settle in the caliphate together with 
families, including kids – a call that people from all over the world responded to positively 
(Van Ginkel and Entenmann 2016; The Soufan Group 2015). Additionally, research shows 
that these so-called Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) have become younger over time (The 
Soufan Group 2015, 13). The UN (UN Security Council Resolution 2174, 2014) and EU 
                                                          
1 This article has also appeared as a publication of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). URL: 
https://icct.nl/publication/children-of-the-caliphate-young-is-returnees-and-the-reintegration-challenge/ 
2 In this article, the terms children and minors are used interchangeably to refer to those who are distinguished 
from adults, in most countries this group is seen as those aged 0-18 or 21 years old; the term juveniles is used in 
the context of the criminal justice system, referring to those above the national age of criminal responsibility 
who, by law, are distinguished from adult offenders in the criminal justice system on account of their age. 
(Council of the European Union 2017) have expressed their concern about FTFs, and recently 
this concern increasingly focused on returning FTFs and the risks this might pose: not only are 
these returnees possibly sent home with an assignment to commit an attack or recruit people, 
but a number of returnees has committed crimes abroad or might return with mental health 
problems (for example, AIVD 2017). The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service 
(AIVD) and National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) published a 
report in April 2017 titled “Minors with ISIS” (“Minderjarigen bij ISIS”) (AIVD and NCTV 
2017). The report does not solely focus on what to do with young returnees, but largely on 
what life for minors looks like in the Caliphate, underlining the importance of these 
experiences when determining the needs of returning children. As a number of these returning 
FTFs (both adults and minors) will be prosecuted for offences committed in Syria and Iraq, it 
is important to consider rehabilitation and reintegration efforts, in order to mitigate risks and 
minimise the chance of recidivism.  
 
Before looking more closely at approaches to rehabilitate and reintegrate these juvenile violent 
extremist offenders (VEOs) and IS returnees, it is important to have a proper understanding 
of the scope of the issue. Establishing the number of children living in the Caliphate is 
difficult: information coming from within IS territory cannot be verified. It is even more 
difficult to verify the numbers of children born in Syria or Iraq (RAN 2016). The EU 
emphasizes the large differences between these children and the context within which they 
were either brought to IS-territory by their parents or born there (Council of the European 
Union 2017, 3, 6). They distinguish between four groups of children: 1) minor refugees; 2) 
minor FTFs; 3) children born and raised by European FTFs in Syria/Iraq; and 4) children 
remaining in the EU, whilst parents/siblings have travelled to Syria and/or Iraq (Ibid, 3). Some 
countries have published statistics on minors in IS territory, for example, the Dutch security 
services claim there are at least 80 children with a ‘Dutch link’ in Syria and/or Iraq: half of 
them travelled with their parents, the other half was born there. 50% is therefore three years or 
younger, 30% is between four and eight, and under 20% is nine years or older (AIVD 2017, 
6).3  
 
Balancing risks and rehabilitation 
 
But what risk do these children pose? And what to do upon their return in order to reintegrate 
them? Firstly, it is important to briefly note that age matters: naturally, there is a difference in 
both the short term and long term security risks posed by a 3-year-old child or a 15-year-old 
juvenile. To illustrate this, children of the Caliphate are perceived as ‘cubs’ growing into 
                                                          
3 ‘Dutch link’ refers to one or two parents with Dutch nationality or parents that lived in the Netherlands for a 
long period of time. 
‘lions’: once they hit puberty, they can join the armed conflict (anywhere between the ages of 
9-15) (AIVD 2017, 5). Secondly, as noted by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) 
to the Council of the EU states, minors can be both a threat and a victim – with regards to 
children in armed conflict, posing a threat does not exclude being a victim (Council of the 
European Union 2017). This asks for a multidisciplinary reintegration approach for these 
juvenile returnees. In practice, that means law enforcement and security agencies as well as 
child protection services need to be included with a focus on both welfare and security (Ibid.). 
The Dutch security services report also argues that these minors are first and foremost victims 
of the so-called Islamic State, due to the stress and trauma inflicted by the violence 
experienced. The report emphases this does not mean there should be no attention for the 
risks these minors potentially pose to Dutch society or for the crimes they potentially 
committed abroad (AIVD 2017, 16-17).  
 
The combination of training children might have received, potential crimes committed, the 
sheer volume of propaganda and indoctrination they experienced and potential traumas they 
might suffer, can provide a lethal mix – the security risks of which cannot be underestimated. 
These children are potential perpetrators of violent crimes, a fact that warrants an approach 
that goes beyond the view of victimised individuals. Even though the ultimate goal of any 
government initiative should be aimed at rehabilitating and reintegrating these minors (back) 
into society, they should be based within a clear security/law enforcement framework. As 
governments are shaping responses to returning FTFs, and the juvenile/youth aspect has 
shown to become increasingly relevant, it is important to understand if and how juvenile 
violent extremist offenders (JVEOs) are different from either regular juvenile criminal 
offenders or from adult violent extremist offenders.  
 
In this article, we will look at the challenges regarding this specific group of FTF returnees. In 
part one we ask ourselves: What do current rehabilitation programmes for terrorists 
worldwide look like? And what do countries do differently for foreign terrorist fighters as 
opposed to ‘regular’ terrorist reintegration and rehabilitation programmes? In the second part 
we zoom in on the question of what sets juvenile VEOs apart from either their ‘regular’ 
criminal counterparts or adult terrorists?; and what do countries currently do regarding young 
children and adolescents who have engaged in (extremist) violence?; Third and finally, we aim 
to answer the question: what are the implications of these programmes and differences 
between offender types for the approach towards returning children of the caliphate and 
young violent extremist offenders in general?4 A number of initial recommendations will be 
                                                          
4 A note on terminology: in this article, we follow the definition of violent extremism as proposed by Schmid 
(2013, 10), namely people who are ‘positively in favour of the use of force to obtain and maintain political 
power’. Terrorism is defined as ‘a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action 
presented based on the analysis, aiming at contributing to a comprehensive approach in 
dealing with JVEOs. 
 
Rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremist offenders: current approaches 
 
In the past decade, numerous rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent 
extremists have been developed. For example, comprehensive programmes have been 
established in in Europe (Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom, Germany), Southeast Asia 
(Singapore, Indonesia), and the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt). Each of these 
countries has developed its own approach to promote desistance from terrorism or violent 
extremism. The desistance process has been labelled differently as well, for instance, what is 
called rehabilitation in some countries could be labelled as reformation, re-socialisation, de-
radicalisation, disengagement, reintegration, diversion or re-insertion in other countries. For 
the purposes of providing a clear overview, we will from here onwards use the term 
rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.  
 
An initial analysis of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes leads to the conclusion that 
while many countries have implemented rehabilitation programmes, they vary widely as to 1) 
who is targeted by the programmes (e.g. terrorists, returnees or individuals who are deemed 
vulnerable to radicalisation; 2) in what phase or setting the programmes are implemented (e.g. 
pre-prison, in-prison, post-prison); 3) on what basis individuals participate in the programme 
(voluntarily or mandatory); 4) who is responsible for the implementation of the programme 
(e.g. prison wardens, social workers, psychologists or religious scholars); and 5) what 
components make up the programme (e.g. psychological counselling, education, religious 
counselling).  
 
The majority of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes focuses on a broad category of 
terrorist (or violent extremist) offenders, thus including a focus on foreign terrorist fighters. 
Where some countries solely target those extremists who have committed an offense, i.e. 
Algeria’s Repentance and De-radicalization in Prison programme that focuses specifically on 
prisoners convicted of terrorist acts (Ashour 2009); other programmes have a broader focus 
and aim not only to counter already radicalised individuals but also to prevent radicalisation 
either in society at large or for specific groups within society that have been deemed vulnerable 
to radicalisation. The Canadian city of Montreal initiated a prevention- oriented programme, 
implemented by the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its 
propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties’ (Schmid 2011, 86-87). Foreign 
Terrorist Fighters is defined as ‘an agent who (i) has joined, and operates within the confines of an insurgency, 
(2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official 
military organisation; and (4) is unpaid’ (Hegghammer 2010/2011, 56-57).  
aim to "stop the spreading of extremism, identify individuals that are in a process of 
radicalization toward violence and contribute to their disengagement" (Bérubé 2015). The 
programme addresses issues of de-radicalisation and rehabilitation while at the same time 
being more preventative in nature.   
 
Another element that differs per country is the phase in which violent extremists are targeted. 
Most programmes focus on the prison context, but the programmes that are more 
preventative in nature either focus on vulnerable individuals that have not yet committed a 
crime (pre-prison) or have an all-encompassing approach including both pre- and post-
prison individuals. For instance, the UK developed the PREVENT and CHANNEL 
programme, focusing on individuals that are viewed as vulnerable to radicalization (website 
gov.uk 2015). Post-prison, countries focus on probation services, or other aftercare services 
such as assistance in finding employment and housing (Kouwenhoven 2015). The reason that 
most programmes focus on the prison context seems to be that the prison setting provides a 
delineated, controlled environment within a clear criminal justice framework.  
 
The programme components of which most programmes consist range from religious 
interventions to sports activities and job skills training. The component that features most 
frequently is the mandatory participation of detained or suspected violent extremist offenders 
in religious discussion or religious lessons provided by the state or state-sanctioned religious 
leaders. The implementation of these religious interventions is based on the premise that most 
violent extremists have an incorrect interpretation of religious theology and/or have been 
misled by leaders in terrorist networks into believing violence is necessary to uphold their 
religion. As a result, sessions are often aimed at discrediting the ideological justification for 
extremism and stimulating violent extremists to distance themselves from extremism. This 
approach is for example used in Yemen, Singapore (website Religious Rehabilitation Group 
2016) and Indonesia (Horgan and Braddock 2010). Other examples of programme 
components are psychological interventions such as cognitive behavioral therapy or anger 
management sessions (Mullins 2010); education, ranging from high school to university 
diplomas to specific certificates for individual courses; recreational activities such as 
participation in sports, theatre, arts and music (Boucek 2008, 18); and many programmes 
include job skills training by offering practical workshops in mechanical skills, tailoring, 
carpentry or agriculture.  
 
Another common element that often plays a role alongside the content of the programme is 
financial support. Specifically, a number of countries incorporate some form of stipends for 
the violent extremist offender (i.e. Indonesia) (Neumann 2010, 53) or provide loans or 
financial support to the detainees’ family (i.e. Saudi Arabia and the Philippines) (Ibid). 
Poverty is often perceived as a fertile ground for violent extremism (Sterman 2015), thus – in 
many countries – include financial support based on the assumption that VEOs turned to 
extremist networks for additional income or to fight for social justice. Financial aid that is 
given to the individual as part of rehabilitation programmes is in place to reduce the incentive 
of re-joining terrorist networks upon release from prison. On the other hand, financial aid 
that is provided to the families of convicted radicals is intended to prevent family members 
from becoming financially dependent on terrorist networks or resorting to mass violence to 
express their frustration with their financial circumstances. In the Indonesian programme, for 
example, the costs of family members who travel to prison in order to visit the inmate are 
reimbursed (Sim and Huda Ismail 2016).  
 
Finally, more and more rehabilitation and reintegration programmes include families and 
community networks in programmes. Aside from focusing on the individual violent extremist 
offender in de-radicalisation and disengagement programmes, governments often prepares 
communities to be more receptive to returning detainees and ex-terrorists (Boucek 2008, 4). 
The idea is to engage communities in the process of reintegrating ex-terrorists and improving 
social cohesion. An example is the Colombian programme, which focuses on the resettlement 
of families to remove them from the extremist environment (Horgan and Braddock 2010, 
271).  
 
What do countries do differently to reintegrate Foreign Terrorist Fighters ? 
 
As the above shows, there is a wide variety of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for 
violent extremist offenders on a global scale (Schuurman and van der Heide 2016). Although 
these programmes differ across countries, depending on contextual factors, their focus on 
violent extremism and terrorism is very clear. With the increasing concern about returning 
FTFs, the next question would be if any programmes specifically designed for this target 
group, and if so, what are the main differences between programmes for ‘regular’ terrorists 
and returned FTFs?  
 
The United Nations emphasised the importance of designing and implementing rehabilitation 
and reintegration of returning foreign terrorist fighters in UN Security Council Resolution 
2178 (2014), which calls for “developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and 
reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters” (UN Security Council 
Resolution 2174, 2014). The EU CTC, through the European Commission, made a similar 
claim, calling for the development of risk assessment tools and rehabilitation and reintegration 
programmes for these returning FTFs. The question of how to conduct risk assessment lies 
beyond the scope of this paper, but should nevertheless be an integral part of rehabilitation, as 
it provides information on individuals’ needs and the risks they pose. The EU CTC emphasises 
that programmes should be developed both inside and outside of correctional settings, as 
programmes outside prison walls can be helpful in bridging the gap that has resulted from 
complications in prosecuting returning FTFs due to difficulties in collecting – and lack of – 
evidence (Council of the European Union 2016).  
 
Despite this call, there are few programmes that focus specifically on returning FTFs. In an 
article analysing programmes developed by the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), 
eighteen of the 30 Member States of GCTF implemented specific rehabilitation and 
reintegration programmes for FTF – most of which build on existing programmes, whilst 
others developed new initiatives (Mehra 2016, 20). These programmes vary widely: for 
instance, a Dutch initiative called EXITs, focuses on returnees that can participate on a 
voluntary basis, whereas the Danish Aarhus programme includes an exit component that 
focuses solely on returning FTFs who are not being prosecuted for criminal charges (Ibid). In 
France, so-called “Centers for Prevention, Integration and Citizenship” were planned to open, 
focusing on de-radicalisation. The aim was to open twelve centers, of which one would focus 
specifically on individuals who traveled to conflict zones, but of whom it is unknown they 
joined a jihadist group (Uhlmann 2016). So far, these centers have faced complications: first, 
the opening of the centers has been delayed repeatedly, and secondly, the one center that did 
open has been widely criticised by the French Senate. Criticism focused on a lack of evaluation 
and preciseness in designing of the mechanisms and programme (McAuley 2017). Since 2012, 
the German al-Hayat programme includes an assessment of returned FTFs who are put 
through a process of counseling and reintegration if possible and needed. The programme 
focuses on ideological and pragmatic elements (such as finding employment) as well as 
addresses the re-establishment of family relations and potentially finding an alternative 
network (Lister, 2015). Although the focus lies on returnees, the programme elements differ 
little to non from VEO programme elements. Finally, Jordan designed a programme 
specifically for returned FTFs: most returned FTFs are sentenced to a high-security prisons, 
but for the individuals who pose a lower risk the Community Peace Centre opened in 2015. 
The center largely focuses on ideological aspects, as government-sanctioned clerics preach 
anti-violence messages to the participants (Counter Extremism Project 2017).  
 
Despite these initiatives, most rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for VEOs do not 
seem to have a specific approach for returnees. Moreover, these initiatives appear to largely 
focus on individuals outside of the criminal justice sector, such as voluntary participants or 
individuals who are not being – or cannot be prosecuted. So far, inside prison walls, 
rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for VEOs are rarely specifically designed for 
returning FTFs. Overall, the programme elements appear to barely differ from the elements as 
seen in the programmes for ‘regular’ VEOs. 
 
Furthermore, researchers and international organisations alike note the possibility to 
implement rehabilitative efforts in different stages of the criminal proceedings, including the 
pre-trial stage, the trial stage and the post-trial stage. Finally, over the past years attention has 
increasingly been devoted for providing diversion programmes as an alternative to a prison 
sentence (Entenmann et. al 2015a; Entenmann et. al 2015b). The main lesson to be drawn 
from all these attempts is the importance of not reinventing the wheel: the sheer amount of 
experience and knowledge of rehabilitation and reintegration of VEOs can assist in doing the 
same for a specific target audiences such as returned FTFs or minor FTF (Entenmann et. al 
2015b, 22).  
 
What sets juvenile VEOs apart from their ‘regular’ criminal counterparts or adult 
terrorists? 
 
The main question in determining how to treat juvenile VEOs is if and how they are different 
from either ‘regular’ juvenile criminal offenders or from adult VEOs. Unfortunately, there is a 
lack of rigorous research and reliable statistics on juvenile violent extremist offenders or young 
people who engage in terrorism (RAN 2016). Partially, this is due to general difficulties in the 
field such as the fact that the population of terrorists is already small in many countries. 
However, we do know more about juvenile criminal offenders that have been involved in 
conflict zones as many studies have been carried out analysing the role of recruitment of 
children, the role of child soldiers and the effects of indoctrination within the larger 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) framework (Human Rights Watch 
2015; Stichick Betancourt and Tanveer Khan 2008).  
 
For example, juveniles from conflict zones are, as discussed earlier, not just perceived as 
perpetrators, but also as victims – meaning that intervention is most likely needed for the 
trauma these children have experienced (RAN 2016). Trauma can have a wide range of 
consequences throughout the lives of these children, such as substance abuse, aggression, 
criminal behaviour and suicide (United Nations 1996). When it comes to the issue of the 
involvement of youths in terrorism, there is a range of theories as to why they are particularly 
vulnerable to extremist narratives. These include cognitive aspects such as the identity 
formation process and youths’ vulnerability during this process, the social context of juveniles, 
including the impact of families or the lack of family ties, as well as the social milieu 
influencing juveniles. The latter is particularly relevant to the situation of young children and 
teens who have returned from conflict areas such as Syria and Iraq, where the social 
environment has provided such a strong and closed off specific group culture that they are 
essentially socialised into terrorism. IS is known for its instrumentalisation of children, 
featuring children dominantly in its media output in roles ranging from soldiers to recruiters 
and executioners (Winter 2016). According to John Horgan and Mia Bloom, IS strategically 
lures children into its sphere of influence in subtle ways, ‘attracting local children by offering 
free toys and candy in exchange for simply showing up’ (Horgan and Bloom 2015). Minors 
are groomed, taught to spy on their families and friends and become socialized into IS ranks 
in different positions. Through being subjected to IS’ indoctrination, which is specifically 
intended to turn them into child soldiers, such children require specific care (Horgan et. al 
2016).  
 
At the same time, this is not new, as many youths in conflict areas have been socialised into 
the violent extremist networks, although these are not always necessarily terrorist networks. 
Examples include juvenile offenders that have been members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda, youths that have been recruited and trained by Boko Haram in Nigeria and young 
adults that have joined ranks with violent groups such as gangs in the United States (Arciaga 
Young and Gonzalez 2013). Children in particular may commit crimes because of their phase 
of maturity, susceptibility to peer and adult influence, and social circumstances, all of which 
are likely to be amenable to change (Richards 2011). Also, JVEOs have shown to participate in 
or attempt to engage in extremist violence for motivations ranging from indoctrination and 
coercion to criminal opportunism, or religious and political conviction (Global Center and 
ICCT 2016). 
 
Young terrorists vs adult terrorists 
 
As with adult VEOs, the importance of risk assessment and an individual approach are of vital 
importance to the rehabilitation and reintegration of JVEOs as well. As a result, in regular 
juvenile detention centers or facilities, a distinction is commonly made between males and 
females, violent and nonviolent offenders and classification is often made based on a 
differentiation of levels of temperament and maturity, as well as social and psychological 
needs. First of all, the age of the individual can give an indication of the life and role of the 
individual whilst in the caliphate. As discussed before, government reports generally assume 
that children join the armed conflict when puberty begins (AIVD 2017, 7-8). This means that 
young children will have a significantly different experience, although it may still be a violent 
experience, from teenagers. Compared to adult offenders, juveniles are especially vulnerable to 
mental, emotional, and physical abuse in the prison context, whether perpetrated by prison 
staff or incarcerated adults (Garcia Bochenek 2016). These differences in the experiences 
children had in the caliphate, makes them different from adults: at least of males, it is expected 
that they participated in training, the armed conflict, or supported this in one way or another 
(AIVD 2016, 7-8).  
 
Any attempt to design specific interventions for this group needs to be grounded in a 
thorough understanding of youth participation in violence and/or criminal behavior. A study 
focusing on the characteristics of life trajectories of early onset and adult onset offenders, 
carried out by Zara and Farrington, found that children and adolescents who – at a young age 
– struggle with problems of internalization5 do not only run a greater risk of engaging in a 
criminal (potentially violent) career as adults, they also face the prospect of ‘a level of life 
failure as serious as that of early onset offenders’ (Zara and Farrington 2013, 245). As a 
consequence, the authors conclude that interventions aimed to prevent this risk from 
materialising should start as early as possible. They point at the essential role of personal 
support from parents and family members, which is deemed ‘a crucial aspect of ameliorating 
individual development and facilitating pro-social adjustment’. However, one of the main 
characteristics of the self-proclaimed caliphate - the specific, controlled, state-like 
environment provided by IS – means that the role of the social environment of the individual 
offenders as a positive, protective factor, does not apply here, as IS members are often 
desensitised from events in their personal environment, such as friends and families (Van der 
Heide and Huurman 2016, 18).  
 
Another study by Zhang, Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber analysed the relationship between 
delinquency and attitudes/behaviour from a developmental perspective. Their main 
conclusion points to the importance of children’s attitudes towards the use of violence and 
violent behaviour (Zhang, Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber 1997). According to their analysis, 
youths who have a tolerant attitude toward violence are more likely to be deviant (in other 
words: likely to engage in criminal (potentially violent) behaviour) than their counterparts 
who had actually engaged in violence. This is particularly relevant for the issue of young 
returnees for two reasons. First, in light of their socialisation into the caliphate of IS, it is much 
more likely that their attitudes are in fact more tolerant or even positive towards the use of 
violence which, if true, would provide a strong indicator for vulnerability to later (potentially 
violent extremist) offending. Second, from a more pragmatic perspective, it is often difficult to 
determine behaviour in hindsight, which provides all the more reason to focus on attitudes 
when young children and adolescents return from Syria/Iraq.  
 
All in all, despite the lack of specific studies into characteristics and treatment of juvenile 
violent extremist offenders, the literature on juvenile delinquency in general and research into 
children engaged in violent groups, gangs and the role of youths in war and conflict zones 
                                                          
5 Internalising behaviors refer to a wide range of behaviors in which children and adolescents direct feelings and 
emotional responses inward. This is perceived as the opposite of externalising behavior, which refers to 
expressing feelings and emotions into behaviors that are directed outward into delinquent or aggressive behavior. 
See Loeber, Rolf, Magda Stouthamer-Loeber and Helene Raskin White (1999). 
specifically, do provide us with relevant insights for the question of how to deal with JVEOs. 
The main conclusions are first of all that juvenile offenders should be viewed as both victims 
as well as potential perpetrators. Second, that the process of identity formation makes 
juveniles more susceptible to indoctrination from violent (extremist) groups but that 
susceptibility can at the same time provide a starting point for treatment as well. Third, that 
the role of the social environment and peer pressure plays a bigger role compared to adult 
offenders and that in the case of IS – this provides a particular challenge as their social 
environment often does not provide a protective or positive influence. Fourth and finally, 
treatment should start with determining the level of internalising behaviours and assessing the 
attitude of youths towards violence – as these two factors have proven to be strongly 
connected to increased vulnerabilities for later criminal (potentially violent) careers.  
 
What do countries do now with juvenile VEOs?  
 
The aspects that set juvenile violent extremist offenders apart from both adult terrorists as well 
as from young, non-extremist delinquents can provide insight and opportunities for their 
treatment and rehabilitation. Research currently conducted by ICCT in cooperation with the 
Global Center on Cooperative Security (Global Center and ICCT, forthcoming) is mapping 
countries’ approaches to the rehabilitation of JVEOs and has found that governments have 
attempted to deal with the issue of juvenile violent extremist offenders in three different ways, 
namely through (1) treating them as adult terrorist offenders, (2) treating them as regular 
juvenile criminals, or (3) providing them with specialised treatments.   
 
A small number of countries treat juveniles as adults when it comes to terrorism-related 
offences: even if dedicated juvenile legislation is applicable, a certain exceptionalism is 
prevalent when it comes to terrorism. In Mali’s capital Bamako, for example, juvenile 
offenders are held together with adult female offenders in the women’s prison due to limited 
resources and infrastructure (US Department of State 2014). Several countries prosecute 
juveniles under (adult) terrorism legislation (UNICEF 2011, 86) and can sentence youths to 
severe punishments, including the death penalty. In other instances, juveniles are held in adult 
prisons despite the existence of dedicated juvenile facilities. In explicit response to 
perpetrators becoming younger and younger, several states are also in the process of lowering 
the age of criminal responsibility, allowing courts to prosecute children as young as 15 (Ibid, 
15). 
 
Other countries have taken a different approach and are treating juveniles similarly to other 
young offenders, prosecuting them in youth courts (Ibid), applying specialised legislation 
including diversion activities (Ibid, 90) and handing down more lenient punishments or 
sentences tailored to juveniles such as dedicated youth facilities. In Austria, which houses a 
small number of juvenile VEOs, these juveniles are integrated with other juveniles in the 
Justizanstalt Gerasdorf juvenile correctional facility.6 At the same time, large numbers of child 
soldiers in armed conflict, zones, including minors in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, 
are cared for in concentrated rehabilitation facilities (Global Forum for Counter-Terrorism, 
forthcoming). Both approaches, treating JVEOs as regular terrorist offenders or as regular 
juvenile criminals, involve different risks. On the one hand, housing JVEOs together with 
other juvenile offenders means there is no specialised staff available to deal with the 
ideological aspect of radicalised youths. Also, it carries the risk that extremist juveniles attempt 
to recruit and radicalise their peers. Finally, politically speaking the punishment of being 
sentenced to a juvenile institute for committing terrorist offenses might be perceived as being 
‘soft on terrorism’ (BBC 2016). On the other hand, from a human rights perspective, housing 
JVEOs among adult violent extremist offenders has negative implications as it is generally 
believed that juveniles require specialised treatment and are particularly amenable to 
rehabilitative treatment (Simpson 1976). Also, according to a UN report (United Nations 
2015) on the mental health of youth, incarcerated juveniles are ‘regularly subject of violence, 
intimidation, exploitation and inhumane conditions’. And housing JVEOs together with adult 
VEOs exposes potentially vulnerable JVEOs to negative influence from their environment. 
 
The third option, providing specialised treatment for juvenile VEOs, potentially circumvents 
the negative implications of the two other policy alternatives. However, as most countries have 
very few juvenile VEOs (Global Center and ICCT 2016) to deal with, setting up designated 
programmes or even facilities for this group is both resource intensive and requires expertise 
that might not yet be available. The first question that needs to be answered by individual 
governments is what is the number of juvenile cases that warrants a separate approach, and 
second: how to best combine the insights from other juvenile offender categories (child 
soldiers, drug addicts) with the existing knowledge on radicalisation and violent extremism.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The approach to dealing with juvenile offenders has undergone considerable changes during 
the past 20 years, generally as well as for specific juvenile offender groups such as children and 
                                                          
6 Currently, 77 individuals are housed at this juvenile institute. As of June 2016, at least two JVEOs have served 
time at Gerasdorf. One is a 16-year old who has been convicted for his involvement in terrorist acts (the juvenile 
admitted to travelling to Syria and being a member of ISIL), and the other is a 15-year old self-radicalized 
individual who admitted to preparing terrorist acts in Vienna. See Reuters World News. 2015. “Teenager in 
Austrian ‘Playstation’ terrorism case gets two years.” 26 May. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-
austria-idUSKBN0OB0LK20150526. See also The Local. 2016. “Is Austria underestimating the threat of 
radicalization?” 29 January. http://www.thelocal.at/20160129/is-austria-underestimating-the-threat-of-
radicalization.  
adolescents that have been involved in violent and terrorist groups. These legal and structural 
changes often concern the implementation of alternative measures, de-radicalisation or 
diversion programs and other restorative techniques in the majority of countries dealing with 
juvenile VEOs. Despite these positive developments, most approaches are still characterised by 
a focus on punishment rather than rehabilitation, prosecution rather than diversion, and on 
detention rather than community alternatives.  
 
Based on our analysis of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist 
offenders and specifically for foreign terrorist fighters, we can conclude that most programmes 
are to a large extent similar to programmes and treatment for ‘regular’ criminal offenders. 
Authorities entrusted with the management and rehabilitation of children and youths in 
correctional settings may at times lose sight of the potential of regular approaches, partially 
due to the assumptions that come with the “terrorist” label and the political pressure of 
national security that may place strains on the rehabilitative approach. These practices often 
respond to public demands on reacting towards juvenile terrorists by more severe sanctioning.  
 
Thus, rather than exceptionalising violent extremists in general and juvenile violent extremists 
in particular, this article presents approaches to rehabilitation and reintegration derived from 
already existing initiatives to and considerations on how they might be tailored to address the 
needs of juveniles convicted of or involved in violent extremism-related crimes. Approaches to 
promote disengagement from violence and extremism will be more effective if they build on 
existing structures for crime prevention and rehabilitation.  
 
Overall, the criminal justice framework within which the treatment of juvenile offenders takes 
place is anchored on their reformative potential. The judicial system, together with the 
correctional and probations services and society at large, plays a critical role in the 
rehabilitation and eventual reintegration of a child in conflict with the law. The effectiveness 
of rehabilitating and reintegrating juvenile VEOs depends for a large part upon their 
knowledge of what sets youths involved in terrorism apart from their regular criminal peers or 
adult offenders, as well as on their collaborative and coordinated efforts throughout the 
duration of custody, rehabilitation, release, and post-release.  
 
Rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for juvenile VEOs (including those returning from IS-
territory), aside from a narrow focus on experienced trauma and criminal offenses committed, 
need to be based on two underlying assumptions: the importance of age and the importance 
of attitudes. Notwithstanding the tailored approach that every individual requires, age should 
inform decision-making and programming. Young children (zero to nine years old) (AIVD 
2017, 5) who are born in IS-territory or brought by their parents at a very young age, should 
be first and foremost be viewed as victims. For older children, other factors such as training 
and potential involvement in violent activities are more likely to play a role, demanding any 
approach that goes beyond the victim-perspective. Additionally, this older group will include 
adolescents who might have undertaken the journey to IS by themselves and who have 
deliberately and more rationally chosen to join IS. The younger group requires special 
attention regarding their internalisation process and professionals need to determine to what 
extent these children have been socialised into IS-culture and whether they cope with their 
experiences more internally ore externally. Older individuals are most likely to have 
internalised IS violent culture and to have been involved in violent activities. To direct 
rehabilitative efforts for them, it is essential to assess their attitude towards violence and to 
what extent they have accepted IS’ norms and behaviors.  
 
As states increasingly confront younger people caught up in violent extremist activity, it is up 
to them to devise corresponding measures. It is not necessary to reinvent the wheel, especially 
where numbers of terrorism convicts in general, and juveniles in particular are low. But 
rehabilitation is considered to work best when tailored to individual needs and policymakers 
need to take into account the very distinctive needs of juvenile offenders as a separate class of 
offenders while respecting all relevant international law and human rights standards in the 
fight against terrorism. Decisions on managing and rehabilitating juveniles should be 
informed by the best interest for the child and by individualised assessments.  
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